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Abstract
If you love someone, is it good to believe better of her than epistemic norms allow? The
partiality view says that it is: love, on this view, issues norms of belief that clash with epistemic
norms. The partiality view is supposedly supported by an analogy between beliefs and actions,
by the phenomenology of love, and by the idea that love commits us to the loved one’s good
character. I argue that the partiality view is false, and defend what I call the epistemic view. On
the epistemic view, love also issues norms of belief. But these say simply (and perhaps
surprisingly) that you should adhere to epistemic norms in forming and maintaining beliefs about
loved ones. I offer two arguments for the epistemic view. The first appeals to the emotional
responses of love, which, when sensitive to what the loved one is really like, can make love great
and be morally transformative. The second is a new argument for why caring for a loved one
requires true beliefs about him. We see that there may be some boundaries, such as stuffy
traditions, that love is right to defy, but that epistemic boundaries are not among them.

This paper was originally published in Synthese* and courteously made available by Dr.
Dormandy for reprint in IJE at the bequest of the Editorial Board:
*Dormandy, K. (2022). Loving truly: an epistemic approach to the doxastic norms of love.
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Introduction
Evidence is mounting that Queen Guenever, the wife of King Arthur, is having an affair with Sir
Launcelot. The only person in Camelot who still believes that Guenever is faithful, short of King
Arthur himself, is the loyal knight Sir Gawain. Gawain even refuses to believe ill of Guenever
when a posse of knights ambushes her and Launcelot in her bedchamber. Instead, Gawain forms
the charitable belief that Guenever must have summoned Launcelot to thank him for rescuing her
so often; the privacy of her bedchamber is advantageous given the court’s propensity to gossip.
Unfortunately, Guenever’s tactful plan backfired, and she now seems guiltier than ever. Gawain
comforts King Arthur by reasoning that “ofttimes we do many things that we [think] it be for the
best, and yet peradventure it turneth to the worst. For I dare say…my lady, your queen, is to you
both good and true” (Malory, 1485, Book XX, Chapter 7).
It is a common trope that excellent love, be it for a friend, family member, romantic partner, or
someone else, involves thinking well of your loved one—indeed better than epistemic norms
permit. Gawain’s naiveté is exaggerated, but some philosophers defend a more realistic version
of this idea. According to the doxastic-partiality view, love comes with a norm governing the
beliefs that you form about loved ones. This norm says that it is good, from the viewpoint of
love, when these beliefs are positive rather than negative, even if they violate epistemic norms
(Keller, 2004; Stroud, 2006; Hazlett, 2013). For example, the person who loves well takes her1
loved one’s actions to be motivated by kindness rather than cynicism, even given strong
evidence to the contrary.
Several considerations favor the partiality view. First is the claim that love commits you to a
positive view of the loved one (Stroud, 2006). Second, believing partially about loved ones goes
along with treating them partially (Hazlett, 2013). Third, we supposedly want to believe well of
loved ones and for them to believe well of us (Keller, 2004; Stroud, 2006; Hazlett, 2013).
Finally, since love is allegedly based on loved ones’ qualities, inflated beliefs about those
qualities can safeguard it (Stroud, 2006).
But I argue that the doxastic-partiality view is false: love does not issue norms of belief that
conflict with epistemic norms. This is not to deny that love issues norms of belief. I argue that it
does—but that they are standard epistemic norms promoting accurate belief. That is, from the
standpoint not only of epistemology but of love too, it is good to obey epistemic norms when
forming beliefs about a loved one—especially, I’ll argue, when you do so motivated by a
concern to believe accurately about them. The reason is that doing this promotes an accurate
view of your loved one, and an accurate view—even including negative beliefs—in turn
promotes excellent love. I call this the epistemic view of excellent love.
I offer two arguments for the epistemic view. First, love comes with emotional responses, and
these make love great to the extent that they fit the way your loved one really is. Fitting
responses, however, require accurate beliefs. Second, we care for those we love—but to do so
well, we need accurate beliefs about them.
These arguments are situated in an ongoing discussion. Kawall (2013) and Arpaly and
Brinkerhoff (2018) criticize doxastic partiality on similar grounds to me, but we’ll see that their
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arguments do not go far enough. Crawford (2019) argues that excellent love (or friendship)
involves responding to the other person’s “perceived features” (1595). But rather than abandon
doxastic partiality, she remains open to a weak version that I criticize too. Mason (2020) draws
on (Murdoch,1970) to develop a view of love’s nature that is congenial to my view of its
normativity.
There are two further respects in which my view differs from other critiques of the partiality
view, including Kawall’s (2013), Hawley’s (2014), Arpaly and Brinkerhoff’s (2018), and
Goldberg’s (2019). First, I discuss love instead of friendship. In some ways this difference is
cosmetic, since many authors draw on literature about both, and love is common to many
friendships.2 But I focus on love because this, even more than friendship, provides a theoretical
and imaginative terrain in which the partiality view might root itself. Love is deep, whereas
friendship can be superficial. And love is often depicted as defying boundaries: it rejects family
conventions, throws social rank to the wind, reverses death by a kiss. It is natural to think that
love singes any norms, including epistemic ones, that cross its path.
If we take this boundary-defying picture of love seriously, then a common strategy for
neutralizing the partiality view turns out wrong-headed. This strategy is to show that standard
epistemic norms can accommodate certain forms of partial belief. After all, lovers have more
positive evidence about their loved ones than third parties do, and are more motivated to search
attentively for it (Arpaly & Brinkerhoff, 2018; Goldberg, 2019). And epistemic norms may be
permissive, leaving ample scope for charitable belief (Kawall, 2013; Hawley, 2014). The thought
is that, once partialists recognize these possibilities, they should repent of the “understandable”
mistake that excellent love clashes with epistemic norms (Goldberg, 2019, 2227). But if love is
fundamentally boundary-defying, then widening our epistemic boundaries to accommodate it
risks begging the question.
This is why I do not develop an epistemological framework to accommodate partial beliefs about
loved ones. Like Jollimore (2011, chapter 3), Kawall (2013), and Mason (2020), I criticize the
partiality view’s conception of love itself. We may grant, I argue, that love does well to reject
some norms, such as stodgy and unreasoned traditions. But there are other norms that love shines
brightest by obeying—such as norms of sexual consent, personal autonomy, and (I argue)
epistemology. The epistemic view says that love, far from rejecting epistemic norms, is best
manifested by respecting them.
The discussion of doxastic partiality bears superficial resemblance to another debate about love.
The latter concerns whether the quality view holds: whether love is, or should be, based on
evidence about your loved one.3 The difference is this: the quality-view debate concerns the way
in which evidence about your loved one affects your love for them; in contrast, the doxasticpartiality debate supposes that you love them and asks how your evidence, or other epistemic
factors, should affect your beliefs about them.
But what is excellent love? It is not necessarily deep love, since depth is partly a function of
time, and excellent love can be new. Nor is it necessarily passionate love, since passion—or
heat—can be replaced over time by depth. One answer to the question unfolds in this paper:
excellent love is love that obeys epistemic norms. The premises I argue from are thus
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commitments to some of excellent love’s other features. One is that excellent love involves
creating a safe emotional space, and the opportunity for secure attachment and vulnerability.
Another is that excellent love involves caring for the other party; this is a matter of facilitating
his flourishing, at least to the extent that he welcomes this.
Section 2 presents the partiality view and Sect. 3 presents the epistemic view. Section 4 defends
the epistemic view by appealing to the emotional responses proper to love, and Sect. 5 does so
by appeal to our care for loved ones. Section 6 argues, by addressing an objection, that adhering
to epistemic norms promotes accurate beliefs in love. Section 7 addresses the arguments for the
partiality view, and Sect. 8 concludes.
Doxastic Partiality
The idea that love issues norms of belief may seem strange. For beliefs have norms of their own,
epistemic ones. Epistemic norms often support positive beliefs about loved ones. But sometimes
they support negative beliefs—after all, everyone typically manifests at least some negative
characteristics.
So, in a world like ours, the partiality view is headed for a conflict with epistemic norms. When
epistemic norms point toward negative beliefs about a loved one, the normativity of love
supposedly points the other way. Here is a summary of the partiality view:
The Partiality View: An excellent-making feature of love is (i) the forming and maintaining of
positive, or at least minimally negative, beliefs about your loved one, even if this requires
violating epistemic norms; where (ii) your love is a significant factor motivating such beliefs.
The normativity here is not prescriptive: love does not require you do anything. It is rather
evaluative: it concerns what makes a given case of love excellent. This distinction matters,
because the prescriptive claim is stronger than the evaluative one. The claim that love requires
you to form positive beliefs entails that forming positive beliefs makes a given case of love
excellent, but the reverse does not hold: that forming positive beliefs makes love excellent does
not entail that love requires you to form them. After all, there may be cases where two things that
make love excellent cannot be jointly realized—and there is little reason to think that love would
require one at the expense of the other. Proponents of the partiality view do not always specify
whether their version is prescriptive or evaluative.4 I will argue against the evaluative version of
the partiality view, and thus a fortiori against the prescriptive one. For I want to show that love
issues no normative pressure whatsoever to defy epistemic norms—and that it issues normative
pressure, instead, to obey them.
Here are some characteristic statements of the partiality view (italics added):5
Friendship places demands not just on our feelings or our motivations, but on our beliefs and our
methods of forming beliefs…. [T]his epistemic partiality is contrary to the standards of
epistemic responsibility and justification held up by mainstream epistemological theories.
(Stroud, 2006, 499)

https://digitalcommons.humboldt.edu/ije/vol5/iss1/4

6

et al.: Doxastic Norms of Love

[F]riendship requires (being disposed towards) an unreliable doxastic practice, namely, what I
have called “partiality bias.” (Hazlett, 2013, 97)
[S]ometimes, being a good friend can mean failing to be good in another important respect; it
can mean failing to be a good believer. Sometimes, to be a good friend, you need to compromise
your epistemic integrity. (Keller, 2007, 25)
[T]he specific differential practices and beliefs the good friend adopts … seem to lead her into a
distorted conception of reality…. [F]riendship involves, if not a blind spot, at least less than
perfect vision where your friends’ sins and flaws are concerned; the good friend’s set of beliefs is
to that extent necessarily out of kilter. As a good friend, your belief set is slanted: you actually
believe your own spin. (Stroud, 2006, 513)
Although the partiality view lauds epistemic violations, it is not draconian. Love’s supposed
victory over epistemic norms is not winner-takes-all. Epistemic violation admits of degree, and
the partiality view is compatible with greater or lesser ones. For example, if you saw your loved
one do something apparently rude, excellent love need not involve flat-out disbelieving this. You
might instead regard instances of rudeness as minor in your “overall portrait” of her character
(Stroud, 2006, 508), or give high but not certain credence to a more charitable explanation than
epistemic norms allow. The partiality norm leaves room for negotiation, as long as you flout
epistemic norms somewhat.
The extent of their flouting depends on which version of the partiality view is operative. On
Stroud’s version (2006), the clash between love and epistemic norms is strong; those who love
well flout epistemic norms frequently and egregiously. To the extent that the other person
displays negative qualities, “the good friend’s set of beliefs is necessarily out of kilter” (513,
emphasis added). On Keller’s view (2004), by contrast, the situations in which excellent love
involves epistemic violation are occasional and less egregious; he says that “sometimes, the
norms of friendship clash with epistemic norms” (330). Hazlett (2013) is in the middle. On the
one hand he says that partiality does not apply when evidence against your beloved is
unmistakable (92); on the other hand, he insists that excellent love is doxastically unreliable (97,
102).6
One argument for the partiality view draws on the idea that love (or friendship) involves
commitment, and that this includes commitment to the goodness of the other person’s character
(Stroud, 2006, 511–512).
A second consideration draws an analogy to ethics. We should act partially toward loved ones,
for example by helping them in ways that we would not help strangers. Hazlett claims that there
is “no reason to expect” belief to be any different (2013, 93).
A third argument concerns phenomenology. When we love someone, we strongly incline to
believe good of him, and supposedly feel anything else to be disloyal (Stroud, 2006, 503–504).
And when someone loves us, we supposedly want her to believe well of us, even despite
evidence to the contrary (Keller, 2004, 338; Hazlett, 2013, 90).
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A fourth argument comes from the quality view of love. If love is based on your beloved’s
positive characteristics, then positive beliefs are crucial to preserving it (Stroud, 2006, 511).
A fifth argument appeals to thought experiments. In a case from (Stroud, 2006), elaborated by
(Crawford, 2019), a third party says that your friend Reggie led someone on and knowingly
broke her heart. Stroud’s intuition is that you are disloyal if you do not resist believing this
supposed slandering of Reggie. In a case from (Keller, 2004), Eric is a poetry connoisseur
attending a reading by his friend, Rebecca. He is unfamiliar with her poetry, but knows that most
poems read at this venue are substandard. So, if Rebecca were not his friend he would expect
hers to be poor. But Keller’s intuition is that the good friend Eric will do his best to believe well
of her poem.
I’ll address these arguments in Sect. 7. For now, a comment on the thought experiments. Many
authors have pointed out that they can be read in epistemically benign ways (Jollimore, 2011,
chapter 3; Kawall, 2013; Hawley, 2014; Piller, 2016; Arpaly & Brinkerhoff, 2018; Goldberg,
2019; Crawford, 2019). One way is to construe epistemic norms as permissive. That is, a given
body of evidence does not license merely one doxastic attitude (e.g., a belief or credence) toward
a specific proposition; rather, it may allow a limited range of mutually incompatible ones. A
lover could obey epistemic norms, forming the most positive belief that they permit (Kawall,
2013; Hawley, 2014; Piller, 2016).
However, permissive epistemic norms are neither necessary nor sufficient for deflecting the
partiality view. They are not necessary because, even if permissivism is false, so that each body
of evidence licenses only one doxastic attitude toward a given proposition, that attitude might be
a charitable one (Goldberg, 2019). And permissive norms are not sufficient. First, they concern
only what you do with evidence that you have, saying nothing about how you gather new
evidence. Yet doxastic partialists are equally adamant that the good lover’s evidence-gathering
also facilitates positive beliefs (Goldberg, 2019). Second, epistemic norms can be reliabilist or
virtue-theoretic, not involving evidence evaluation at all.7 Permissive epistemology will not
counter the partiality view.
But there are less theoretically laden ways to read such cases as respecting epistemic norms.
First, one might argue that lovers simply have more evidence about their loved ones’ positive
qualities than others do (Jollimore, 2011, chapter 3). Second, certain forms of doxastic partiality
are epistemically acceptable. In the heart-breaking case about Reggie, there is nothing wrong
with scrutinizing the storyteller’s honesty. In the poetry case, it is epistemically good for Eric to
listen for signs of literary quality (Jollimore, 2011, chapter 3; Kawall, 2013). What is
epistemically crucial is that the protagonists scrupulously avoid bias or wishful thinking.
But that these conciliatory suggestions would leave many doxastic partialists cold. As we saw,
they insist that unreliability is inevitable (Hazlett, 2013, 97, 102) or distortion necessary (Stroud,
2006, 513).8 The idea seems to be that love is expressed by defying certain normative restrictions
(Baron, 1991, 856). If a system of norms says “Don’t”, then great love—which is “unto itself a
higher law”9—often says “I’ll prove my love by doing it”. Restricting positive beliefs to those
which obey epistemic rules misses the point.
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I’ll now present and defend the epistemic view.
The Epistemic View
The epistemic view agrees with the partiality view that love issues a norm of belief, but disagrees
about what this norm is. On the epistemic view, love is not made excellent by violating epistemic
norms, but by adhering to them:10
The Epistemic View: An excellent-making feature of love is (i) adherence to epistemic norms in
forming and maintaining beliefs about your loved one, even if this requires believing negatively
about her; where (ii) your love is a significant factor motivating you to form accurate beliefs on
important matters concerning your beloved.
Concerning clause (i), the epistemic norms might be internalist or externalist, as we’ll see.
Clause (ii) specifies that love—rather than, say, intellectual pride—plays an important role in
motivating your beliefs. As for important matters, these include your loved one’s character, what
she cares about, certain significant actions of hers, and so forth.
The epistemic view is diametrically opposed to the partiality view. The partiality view declares
the excellence of love-motivated positive beliefs, even if these violate epistemic norms, whereas
the epistemic view extols love-motivated adherence to epistemic norms even this yields negative
beliefs.
The epistemic view, like the partiality view, is normative in the evaluative sense: adhering to
epistemic norms is not required, but rather excellent-making. This leaves open the possibility of
situations where the all-things-considered best option, from the viewpoint of excellent love, is to
decline to adhere to epistemic norms in forming beliefs about a loved one. What the epistemic
view insists on, however, is that the love in such a case is not perfectly excellent.
The epistemic view might seem strange. After all, excellent lovers do form beliefs about loved
ones differently than about others, and there would be something wrong with them if they didn’t
(Marušić, 2015). But the epistemic view takes this difference on board—it just accounts for it
differently than the partiality view. To see how, consider clause (ii) of the epistemic view. This
says that your love is a significant factor motivating you to form beliefs in the way it deems
excellent. This is already one way in which you form beliefs about loved ones differently than
about third parties: you are motivated by love.
But what difference does love make? One is that, because you care more, you pay closer
attention (Jollimore, 2011; Pettigrove, 2012). This is not a self-interested care (as with
surveillance of an enemy), but a tender, other-directed care (see Sect. 5). The partiality view
agrees. But whereas the partiality view says that the excellent lover pays attention to the loved
one’s positive features, the epistemic view says that he pays attention to the loved one—
irrespective of whether the latter’s features are positive or negative. In other words, the partiality
view says that you avoid allowing her negative features to affect your beliefs, whereas the
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epistemic view says that you avoid allowing her negative features, which you notice because you
notice her, to affect your love for her.
What about the fact that lovers tend to be biased to perceive the positive and overlook the
negative in their loved ones? The partiality view zeroes in on this descriptive observation to
fashion its normative account. The epistemic view takes a broader lens. However accuracyconducive love’s natural inclinations happen to be, love is excellent to the extent that we strive
for greater accuracy yet. Consider an analogy. A child may be naturally inclined, or not, to share
their toys. Either way, we teach them moral excellence by encouraging the virtue of generosity.
This is not to say that love’s natural inclinations to focus on the good are bad from the viewpoint
of love. It is to say that this is not the whole story—that this inclination, perhaps thoroughly
laudable, must be complemented with the inclination to know, and to love, the other party as she
really is.
These considerations can help us clarify what sort of epistemic norms the epistemic view is
committed to: norms that promote accuracy. We may debate which sorts of norms these are
specifically (see Sect. 6)—for example whether they are internalist (focusing on evidence
available from the agent’s perspective) or externalist (focusing on the reliability of the agent’s
belief-forming processes). But to preempt misunderstanding, a word about one thing that they
are not. To the extent that the epistemic norms do emphasize evidence, they must, to promote
accuracy, take account of the special sorts of evidence that we get about loved ones. This
includes experiences that we have of loved ones to which other people are not party, and things
that we notice that others, because they lack the biased perception of love, overlook (Jollimore,
2011; Pettigrove, 2012). Any epistemology that neglects this sort of evidence in favor of merely
third-personal considerations is not apt to be accuracy-conducive.11
Two other accounts bear some resemblance to the epistemic view.12 First, Mason’s (2020)
“Murdochian” account (cf. Murdoch, 1970) says that loving someone entails knowing important
things about her. But whereas the Murdochian view concerns love’s nature (descriptively), the
epistemic view concerns love’s normativity. And the Murdochian view focuses on having
knowledge of the loved one, whereas the epistemic view focuses on adhering to epistemic norms
out of a care for such knowledge.
Second, the “vision view” construes love as a way of perceiving your loved one that involves
paying special, devoted, attention to him (Jollimore, 2011 chapter 3; Pettigrove, 2012, chapter 5).
This doxastic practice of love, far from detracting from accuracy, helps you accurately perceive
features of your beloved that others cannot. Yet this practice does not perfectly promote
accuracy, says the vision view, since loving perception does risk distortion (Jollimore, 2011, 72).
My main point of contention with the vision view concerns cases in which love’s characteristic
belief-forming practices, though often accurate, go astray. The vision view attributes such cases
to inevitable imperfections in love’s otherwise sound practices. The epistemic view, in contrast,
says that excellent love strives to avoid errors altogether. Excellent love is epistemically
perfectionist: to the extent that the natural belief-forming process of love mislead, excellent love
seeks to correct them.
Here is a summary of my argument for the epistemic view:
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The Argument from Accuracy
1. Accurate beliefs (on important matters) about those we love are an excellent-making feature of
love. (The Accuracy Norm of Love)
2. Abiding by the epistemic view—that is, forming beliefs about loved ones by (i) adhering to
epistemic norms, where (ii) our love is a significant factor motivating us to form accurate beliefs
on important matters concerning loved ones—is conducive to accurate beliefs about those we
love. (The Accuracy-Conduciveness Claim)
3. Therefore, the epistemic view holds: forming beliefs about loved ones by (i) adhering to
epistemic norms, where (ii) our love is a significant factor motivating us to form accurate beliefs
on important matters concerning loved ones, is an excellent-making feature of love.

Consider premise 1, the Accuracy Norm of Love. Three characteristics make beliefs accurate.
First, an individual belief is accurate only if it is true, and a belief set is accurate only to the
extent that it contains true beliefs. But accuracy is more than truth. Second, a belief set is
accurate to the extent that it is representative—it does not distort the big picture by omitting
important information. Third, a belief set is accurate to the extent that the beliefs within it
coherently connect in a web of understanding.13
And accurate beliefs, says premise 2, tend to result when you abide by the epistemic view. I thus
defend the epistemic view on instrumental grounds: abiding by it is accuracy-conducive and this
makes love excellent.14
The bulk of this paper argues for the Accuracy Norm of Love, premise 1 (Sects. 4 and 5). A
briefer argument for the Accuracy-Conduciveness Claim, premise 2, comes in Sect. 6.
Love’s Emotional Responses
My first argument for the Accuracy Norm turns on the emotional responses proper to love. These
make for excellent love, I will argue, to the extent that they fit the way the loved one really is.15
If emotional responses are to fit the loved one, the lover typically needs accurate beliefs about
him. Whether this is because beliefs partly constitute emotions, or simply because they
contribute causally to them, accurate beliefs about a person strongly promote fitting emotional
responses—which in turn, I argue, make love excellent.
I’ll assume that emotions can fit or fail to fit their objects. And I will restrict discussion to cases
in which the object of an emotion—here, your loved one or his features, including his actions—
brings about that emotion in a causally straightforward way.
I’ll suppose further that a person’s features can be positively or negatively valenced. This
valence might be moral, but need not be—it could also (for instance) be aesthetic. I will focus for
simplicity on features with mind-independent valences, such as kindness or cruelty, as opposed
to subjective ones, such as finding a habit annoying or endearing.16 There can be multiple, even
incompatible, fitting responses to a given feature, depending on the context and the person doing
the responding. For example, if your loved one betrays you, anger might be fitting, but so might
be compassion on her circumstances (Pettigrove, 2021).

Published by Digital Commons @ Cal Poly Humboldt, 2022

11

The International Journal of Ecopsychology (IJE), Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 4

I’ll focus on two types of fitting emotional response. A fitting type of response to positive
features is delight, which I will use as an umbrella term for a range of positive emotions from joy
to fond amusement. Yet most loved ones have negative features too, and I will use the umbrella
term grief to refer to responses ranging from minor dismay or irritation to inconsolable sorrow.
For minor flaws, or flaws that are not the loved one’s fault (such as those resulting from
childhood trauma), other responses than grief, such as compassion, or learning to ignore them,
may be fitting. I consider only cases in which grief is fitting. Both delight and grief are directed
not just at the feature, but also at the beloved’s having it.
One might agree that delight is proper to excellent love, but object that grief is selfish and so
diverges from excellence. This may sometimes hold. But there is also a pure kind of grief,
arising from your desire to enjoy relationship with your beloved (Stump, 2010), to identify with
her (Jollimore, 2011), and for her to be the best version of herself (Kawall, 2013); negative
features can impede these aims. As Velleman notes, the emotional responses of love “need not
be exclusively favorable. Love also lays us open to feeling hurt, anger, resentment, and even
hate” (1999, 361).
Let’s consider fitting delight and fitting grief in turn. Fitting delight, I’ll argue, makes love
excellent for the lover and loved one alike. To see this for the lover, imagine a situation in which
much of his delight responds to unrealistically rosy beliefs about his beloved. To the extent that
his beliefs miss their target, so will his emotional responses. In the extreme case his attitude
might not even count as love, but rather idolatry: directing your love at something other than the
loved one herself (Jollimore, 2011, 47; Kawall, 2013, 361; Mason, 2020).17 By contrast, when
the lover’s view of his loved one is accurate, he can delight in her positive features even more
because they (and she) are real as he envisions them.18
Now consider the loved one. There are two reasons why it is good to be delighted in for who one
is and for the features that one has, instead of in response to exaggerated or invented beliefs.
First, as Jollimore (2011) argues, people generally deserve to be celebrated for the unique value
that they have; if your loved one is instead falsely idolized, he misses out on what he deserves.
Second, being idolized instead of delighted in for who one is courts the imposter syndrome, in
which a person fears that she is not as good as people think she is, and that her social or
professional life will collapse if they realize it. A love in which delight is exaggerated in
response to exaggerated beliefs sets the loved one up for this—indeed in the very place that
should be emotionally the safest. If delight is to make love excellent, it must respond to the loved
one as she is.
The same holds for grief over negative features. Love is made excellent when the lover has
accurate beliefs about, and fitting responses of grief to, his beloved’s negative features—and
loves her anyway. (At least, this holds when the loved one is not abusive to the lover; I make no
claims about such cases.) Kawall defends a similar claim (2013, 356–357, cf. Mason, 2020). He
says that,
among the elements of friendship are such things as acceptance, hope, encouragement, and
forgiveness. With our best friends we hope and expect that they accept us, flaws and all; they see
enough value in our other traits, or enough potential to change that they stand by us. They will
hope that we can improve, and will presumably encourage us to do so. They will also typically be
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more forgiving than others when we do fall short. But all of these important aspects of friendship
only come into play as we recognize our friend’s shortcomings, and they ours. Indeed, it is often
taken as a mark of best friends that they are quite aware of our flaws yet they still find us worthy
of love; they recognize our strengths and potentials.

I endorse Kawall’s claim, but his argument for it is vulnerable to partialist objections. We can
divide his argument into two premises: (1) Being a good friend involves certain attitudes,
including “acceptance, hope, encouragement, and forgiveness.” (2) Having these attitudes
requires19 being aware of (certain of) your friend’s shortcomings. Good friendship, Kawall
concludes, requires awareness of (certain of) your friend’s shortcomings.
It is premise (2) that partialists will dispute. One objection applies to three of the four attitudes
that Kawall mentions: acceptance, hope, and encouragement. These attitudes, it says, do not
require a de re awareness of specific shortcomings, but only de dicto awareness that the loved
one, like any person, has shortcomings. That is, you can accept her no matter what, without
committing to the existence of any particular “what”, and you can hope for and encourage her
without thinking that her current state is sub-par. The only attitude that Kawall mentions for
which this partialist response does not hold is forgiveness, which can only be proffered for a
specific offense.
But a second partialist objection covers forgiveness. It says that you need not have accurate
beliefs about every detail of an offense in order to forgive the loved one for it. (Compare: one
might be aware of a tree in the distance, without knowing whether it is an oak or a maple.) You
might know, for example, that your loved one did a specific wrong thing, but you need not know
that she was motivated by a flaw in her character, rather than (say) by extenuating circumstances
or by a positive trait taken to an extreme. A general idea of the deed suffices to forgive it.
In response to these partialist objections, we need to explain why excellent love involves
accurate beliefs about specific shortcomings, where this accuracy reaches a certain threshold of
specificity. I will argue that beliefs that are accurate in these ways, by generating fitting grief,
promote three goods of excellent love: a feeling of mutual safety, secure emotional attachment,
and moral transformation.
To see how, consider the following passage from Edith Wharton’s The Mother’s Recompense.
The long-term bachelor Fred Landers loves the middle-aged Kate Clephane. Yet Kate has a dark
secret that she fears will prompt Fred to abandon her. As a result, she cannot relax in his love—
she needs to confess her secret to him. Here is what happens after she does (Wharton, 1925,
Book 3, Chapters XXIX and XXX):
[Kate] sat down and waited. Curiously enough, she was less unhappy than for a long time past.
[Fred’s] pain and his pity were perhaps what she had most needed from him: the center of her
wretchedness seemed the point at which they were meant to meet …. [B]ut to thank him for what
he was suffering [because of her confession] would have seemed like mockery; and she could
only wait and say to herself that perhaps before long he would go….
After a while he lifted his head and slowly got to his feet. For a moment he seemed to waver; then
he crossed the space between them, and stood before her….
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“The time will come,” he said, “when all this will seem very far off from both of us. That’s all I
want to think of now.”
She looked up, not understanding. Then she began to tremble in all her body…. He was still
looking at her, and she saw the dawn of the old kindness in his [eyes]. He seemed to have come
out on the other side of a great darkness…. He had overcome his strongest feelings, his most
deep-rooted repugnance; he had held out his hand to her, in the extremity of her need, across the
whole width of his traditions and his convictions.
…. It seemed to her that for the first time in her life she had been picked up out of the dust and
weariness, and set down in a quiet place where no harm could come.20

Two things happen. One is that Kate bravely trusts Fred: she makes herself vulnerable by
exposing a feature of hers to which grief—we will suppose for the sake of argument—is a fitting
response. She confesses a specific secret, in enough detail for Fred to fully understand its
repugnance. The second is that Fred responds by experiencing grief, but then showing Kate grace
despite it. Grace, which Pettigrove characterizes as “an intentional act of unmerited favour”
(2012, 127), might include forgiveness, but is a broader category (ibid., 142–150), including a
charitable attitude to negative features extending beyond personal offenses. Fred shows Kate
grace by remaining loyal despite his fitting grief, and declining to give her guilt. Note that it is
Fred’s fitting grief that makes his grace significant. If he were not emotionally moved, his grace
would be cheap. Kate’s making herself vulnerable by exposing her negative feature to Fred, and
his responding with grief and then grace, demonstrate three ways in which vulnerability and
grace can make love excellent:
First, they can cultivate a feeling of safety for both parties. Consider Kate. On one level she gains
an assurance of safety in the relationship: Fred has demonstrated his commitment to her. But on
a deeper level the safety for Kate is existential. In being both seen and loved for who she is—
despite feeling unlovable—Kate feels safe in life itself, indeed for the first time.
Now consider Fred. In trusting him as she has, Kate has demonstrated how much he matters to
her, making an assurance of emotional safety available for him too.
Second, and in this case partly as a result of the increased sense of mutual safety, vulnerability
and grace can deepen the secure attachment proper to excellent love. Where Kate was braced for
rejection, Fred offers her renewed commitment. And Fred, in learning that Kate does not want to
hide things from him, is invited thereby to trust and draw closer to her. Attachment, if fed by
brave vulnerability and grace, is apt not to be insecure (whether avoidant of intimacy, or anxious
about abandonment), but rather secure.21 The reason is that it arises from, and encourages,
emotional honesty on the part of both parties. Kate signals that she wants to be real with Fred
even if it means inflicting grief on him. As for Fred, acknowledging his grief frees him to release
it and move beyond it toward grace.
Third, vulnerability and grace can morally transform lover and loved one. For the loved one,
there are two ways in which making herself vulnerable and being responded to graciously can be
morally transformative. First, it can transform her moral-epistemic faculties by enabling her to
perceive human value. She comes to perceive her own value: she sees herself as the lover sees
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her, namely as well worth the grief that he undergoes for her sake.22 And she comes to recognize
her lover’s value, as it awakens compassion for the grief that he experiences for her sake.
Second, being shown grace in response to vulnerability can help the loved one become a better
person more generally: it can motivate her to live up to the value that her lover has helped her
perceive in herself and in him, and thus to become—for her own sake and as a gift back to him—
someone who needs less grace.
As for the lover, there are two ways in which being trusted with the loved one’s vulnerability,
and responding graciously, can be morally transformative. First, being trusted can be part of
what empowers you to respond graciously to begin with, for it holds up a picture of yourself as
being the sort of person who will respond graciously. Second, showing grace can cultivate
relational and personal virtues, such as patience and magnanimity (cf. Pettigrove, 2012, 91).
These can help you love better: “the recognition of a modest flaw [in one’s beloved] can chafe
against love’s native impulse”, so that “learning to deal with this sort of chafing while continuing
to love the other is part of maturing as a lover” (ibid., 96).
There are three things that I am not claiming. First, I am not claiming that revealing one’s
negative features to a lover will always yield these positive results.23 What I am claiming is that
it will do so to the extent that the love is excellent. Second, I am not claiming that it is always a
good idea to strive for excellent love if doing so might destroy whatever love there already is: the
perfect can sometimes be the enemy of the good. Third, it is not the case that lovers should
always make themselves vulnerable by revealing deep secrets. Doing so is a gift of intimacy for
certain times and places, and for a certain maturity of the love relationship.
The three benefits that I have described—a sense of safety, secure attachment, and moral
transformation—arise when both parties have accurate beliefs about the loved one’s specific
shortcoming and its gravity. They do so, first, by making grief, and thus genuine vulnerability on
the part of the loved one, and meaningful grace on the part of the lover, real possibilities; and
second, by eliciting the lover’s grace, which is significant in proportion to his fitting grief. The
de dicto knowledge that the loved one has shortcomings is too unspecific to merit such a
response; and too shallow an awareness will not merit a response that fits the extent of the
shortcoming. But a fitting emotional response to a specific shortcoming can, through the brave
vulnerability of the loved one and through the grief and grace shown by the lover, contribute to
love’s excellence.
Care
My second argument for the Accuracy Norm supposes that excellent lovers care for their loved
ones in appropriate circumstances.24 Like any actions, caring ones tend to accomplish your aims
to the extent that they are well chosen in response to the way the world is. Caring well for a
person thus requires accurate beliefs, including about them and their needs. As Pettigrove puts it,
“[p]romoting the other’s interests requires an adequate recognition of those interests” (2012, 89;
cf. Tronto, 1993, 137; Baier, 1982, 274; Mason, 2020). Excellent love thus requires accurate
beliefs about the loved one.
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A version of this argument is given by Kawall (2013) and Arpaly and Brinkerhoff (2018). But
we’ll see that it does not go far enough. I will supply the missing step.
Their argument appeals to cases in which true, but negative, beliefs about a loved one would
serve her better than false but positive beliefs. Consider the amateur poet Rebecca and her
poetry-connoisseur friend Eric. Were Rebecca not his friend, Eric would think that her drafts
need serious improvement. But she is, so he manages to believe that they are good, or at least
less rough than they are. He returns the drafts to Rebecca with few suggestions for improvement.
Far from helping Rebecca get published, Eric’s behavior will deprive her of much-needed
feedback and encourage false hope (Kawall, 2013, 357; Arpaly & Brinkerhoff, 2018, 43). One
might think that Rebecca should know better than to rely on friends for honest criticism. But
honest criticism would further her aims, and if her friends will not help her do this, then what
sort of friends are they?
It is hard to see how Stroud’s strong partiality view could respond. Stroud argues that it is
constitutive of friendship to “believe your own spin” (2006, 513), without qualifying her view to
accommodate different contexts. Keller’s and Hazlett’s weaker views, on which partiality is local
and context-sensitive, do better (respectively 2004 and 2013).They may grant that Eric should
obey epistemic norms when offering feedback on Rebecca’s drafts, while insisting that at the
poetry reading, where she needs his sincere support, he should violate epistemic norms and
believe well of the poem that she reads. Their weak partiality view, Keller and Hazlett will say,
achieves the desired result in the feedback and the reading scenarios, whereas the epistemic view
achieves it only in the former.
But their view is problematic too. Jollimore (2011, 50) argues that “belief is a holistic matter—
the content of one’s beliefs depends, in part, on what other beliefs one accepts ... The elimination
or suppression of true beliefs changes the character of one’s other beliefs and can lead to the
formation of beliefs that are straightforwardly false” (2011, 50). And Arpaly and Brinkerhoff
(2018, 47) argue:
Counter-evidential beliefs easily propagate and are bound to become risky, sometimes
unexpectedly, when they meet other beliefs and desires or when new situations come along in
which accuracy is of the essence. There is no safe dose of epistemic irrationality—once you have
allowed it into your life, you are never safe from its repercussions, and neither are your friends.
The idea is that partial but false beliefs that we form now may come back to haunt us later in the
form of faulty background evidence. This argument shows that even the weak partiality view has
a cost: it can promote unwanted error or distortion, hampering you in caring for loved ones when
doing so requires accuracy.
Yet this conclusion does not go far enough to justify rejecting the partiality view in favor of the
epistemic view. For we saw reason to think that the epistemic view has a cost too: a biding by it
will hamper you in caring for the other party when doing so requires positive beliefs. The two
views, then, seem to be at an impasse.
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I will resolve this impasse in favor of the epistemic view. Three considerations speak for it. One
comes from the previous section. We saw that accurate beliefs promote fitting emotional
responses, which can yield personal and moral benefits for loved ones, things we surely want to
give them.
A second consideration arises when we look more closely at cases that seem to support the
partiality view: where we seem to care best for loved ones by believing positively yet
inaccurately about them. I will argue, in contrast, that believing accurately, even if negatively,
enables us to care for them better still.
To see this, imagine that your loved one is struggling to recover from addiction, and your
evidence speaks against his succeeding. Stacked against his success are the statistics for people
in relevantly similar situations, his previous failed attempts, and still-operative factors that
previously sapped his willpower. When he asks whether you think he will recover, it might seem
that the most caring response is a convinced “Of course you will!” You can give him the gift of
encouragement that you really stand by, even if your evidence speaks against it. For if anything
will mobilize your loved one to make the needed changes, however improbably, it is the belief of
those who love him.
The epistemic view may seem cruel for denying this. In fact, it furnishes an even more caring
response. This response is not to believe the improbable “You will definitely recover.” It is to
believe—and communicate—the conditional proposition, “You definitely could recover if you
address what previously kept you from recovering. And because I love you, if you let me I’ll
support you in doing that.” When and how you say this is a sensitive matter. But assuming that
recovery is your loved one’s aim, violating epistemic norms about his prospects, given the
obstacles he faces, will help him much less than maintaining the clear vision toward his goal that
he himself may lack (cf. McGeer, 2008; cf. Kawall, 2013, 363–364).25
A similar point holds for the poetry case. If Eric is in a position to realize that Rebecca’s drafts
are unlikely to impress the agent, the most caring thing he can do is save her from a professional
blunder, while promising to help her: “Great poetry is 1% inspiration and 99% perspiration. You
can do great work if you put your mind to it, and I’ll help!” But what if, as in Keller’s original
case, Eric does not read the drafts, and has only his knowledge of the venue to go on? Here it is
not clear that such circumstantial evidence would prescribe believing that Rebecca’s poetry is
substandard (cf. Jollimore, 2011, 54). But suppose the case is strong (e.g., Eric has regularly
attended this venue for the past decade). In this case, I suggest that the caring response is not to
believe that her poetry will be good, but to mentor her in advance, or (if time does not allow),
gently counsel her to postpone the reading until she will truly impress the agent. In general, even
when positive yet inaccurate beliefs might be caring, accurate beliefs—with a commitment to
help—are more caring still.
Empirical results support this idea. We are most apt to succeed not when we believe that we are
great, but when we believe that if we work hard we can perform greatly (Dweck, 2006), and
when we are motivated to work hard by a passion for accomplishing our aim (Duckworth, 2017).
Far from believing positively no matter what, you can best care for someone by encouraging
these more constructive attitudes and signaling your commitment to stand by her.
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Here is the third consideration supporting the epistemic view. I have granted that believing
positively can be a form of care, while arguing that believing accurately is a superior form of
care. But believing positively can also do unintended damage. If you express, or emphasize, your
positive beliefs about a loved one, you can inadvertently change the emotional register from one
of valuing them to one of evaluating them. This can make salient the risk that they will fail to
measure up (Dweck, 2006). In the extreme it can promote the imposter syndrome. Consider the
following real-life example. Bruce Brown and Rob Miller of Proactive Coaching LLC26
conducted an informal survey over three decades, asking children about their worst memories of
playing sports. The overwhelming response was, “The ride home with my parents.” Why?
Parents tended to analyze every move that their child made in the game. No matter that these
analyses were mainly affirming. They turned the focus away from mutual enjoyment of the
shared experience and onto the child’s performance. These assessments, well intentioned as they
are, do not seem to express care nearly as well as what Brown and Miller report grandparents
saying, which is simply, “I love watching you play.” Rather than emphasizing the performance,
the emphasis here is on the child’s intrinsic worth.
The difference between the parents’ and the grandparents’ responses illustrates the difference
between the partiality and epistemic views. The partiality view builds positive evaluation of the
loved one into its conception of excellent love; a fortiori, and however inadvertently, it builds in
evaluation. The epistemic view, by contrast, emphasizes valuing the loved one, just as they are.
I have given two arguments for the epistemic view, particularly for premise 1, the Accuracy
Norm. The previous section argued that accurate beliefs promote fitting emotional responses,
which in turn promote feelings of safety, attachment, and moral transformation. This section
argued that accurate beliefs help you care for loved ones—first, by promoting the goods just
listed; second, by enabling us to further loved ones’ aims; and third, by communicating not an
evaluative attitude, but a valuing one.
We are now in a position to see how adhering to epistemic norms, far from constraining love,
makes it excellent. Epistemic norms in love are thus nothing like stifling traditions. They are far
more like norms of consent. Adhering to them opens up a space for love to be the best it can be.
You can truly encounter, and thus know, respond to, and care for, the other party as she is,
treating her as an infinitely valuable end in herself.
The Objection from Distortion
One might object to the epistemic view on the basis of something I have so far said little about:
what sorts of epistemic norms are at issue. This objection can be posed as a dilemma. One horn
threatens premise 2 of the Argument from Accuracy, and the other threatens premise 1. It goes
like this. Either epistemic norms are internalist, meaning that what matters epistemically occurs
in the believer’s mind, for example whether she respects her evidence (understood as perceptions
and beliefs). Or epistemic norms are externalist, meaning that they concern things that occur
outside the person’s mind, especially whether she formed her beliefs reliably. Horn 1: If the
epistemic norms are internalist, then premise 2 (the Accuracy-Conduciveness Claim), is false,
because love distorts the lover’s evidence about the loved one, leading to inaccurate beliefs about
him. Horn 2: If epistemic norms are externalist, then premise 1 (the Accuracy Norm of Love) is
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false, because, even though love’s distorted perception makes for inaccurate belief-formation, we
can have excellent love. In either case, the Argument from Accuracy fails.27
Taken more slowly, let’s consider horn 1, which works with internalist epistemic norms. A
reasonable internalism will include, as evidence, intersubjectively available considerations (such
as what your loved one said in public). But crucially, we saw that it will also include your
individual experiences of the loved one that are unavailable to third parties (Conee & Feldman,
2004, 112); after all, these are among your most basic sources of information about him. Yet few
would deny that love comes with biased perception: although it can be accurate, it can also
obscure the loved one’s negative features, or portray positive features as more positive than they
really are, perhaps even distorting your perception entirely (Keller, 2004; Hazlett, 2013; Stroud,
2006; Jollimore, 2011, chapter 3). If this is so, we get the internalist objection from distortion:
the perceptual bias of love distorts a person’s evidence. And forming beliefs in accord with
distorted evidence is not accuracy-conducive. So, if the epistemic norms in question are
internalist, says the objection, premise 2, the Accuracy-Conduciveness Claim, is false: adhering
to them is not conducive to accurate beliefs about the loved one.
One response would be to construe epistemic norms as externalist. If this is so, then premise 2
would wind up true, since reliabilist epistemic norms promote accuracy by definition. But then
horn 2 arises—the bump in the carpet reappears at premise 1, the Accuracy Norm of Love. We
may call this the externalist objection from distortion: the perceptual bias of love in this case
prevents the lover from forming reliably accurate beliefs about the loved one to begin with.28 But
if reliably accurate beliefs about the loved one are so hard to come by, then so, by premise 1, is
excellent love! The objector maintains that this conclusion is absurd: of course excellent love is
attainable.29 Premise 1 is false. Externalist norms are no better for the epistemic view than
internalist ones.
Both horns of the dilemma work from the premise that love comes with a distorting perceptual
bias. I have two responses. First, it is not clear that love’s perceptual bias is epistemically bad on
the whole. Biases can be epistemically good: consider the expert’s laden perception that enables
them to distinguish real gold from false. And as we saw, the belief-forming processes typical of
love can help you know your loved one better than a third party would (Jollimore, 2011, chapter
3).
Second, however, let us grant for argument’s sake that love’s perceptual bias does tend to
impugn our evidence or the reliability of our cognition. In response, such a tendency is not
inevitable—it can be counteracted. To see this we need a closer look at clause (ii) of the
epistemic view. This posits a love-motivated care for accuracy in forming beliefs about loved
ones. This amounts to an affective orientation toward certain sorts of truths, which counteracts
the distorting effects of love’s perceptual bias. How? Like any affective orientation, it generates
a bias of its own. We may call this an epistemic bias, because it inclines you to form beliefs in
accuracy-conducive ways. For example, it may foster perceptual and intellectual habits that
sensitize you to fine-grained realities. An epistemic bias can thus temper the distorting effects of
love’s perceptual bias, while supporting its accuracy-conducive ones. And an epistemic bias can
itself be an expression of love, insofar as it arises from the desire to know the loved one as she is.
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To see how love’s perceptual bias and the epistemic bias complement each other, consider an
analogy. A mathematics student grows up in a household of mathematicians. Because of this, she
begins university with a love of math and already honed mathematical thought patterns. But she
will succeed at math only to the extent that she complements these with practice and the
discipline of double-checking her work. Her love of math itself motivates her to take extra care in
forming mathematical beliefs. Similarly, the person who loves excellently is motivated by his
care for accuracy concerning his beloved: he harnesses love’s perceptual bias insofar as it
promotes accuracy, but tempers it insofar as it distorts the truth.
An epistemic bias borne of care for accuracy can mitigate both versions of the objection from
distortion. First, it can attune your mental states to reality, yielding high-quality evidence. If
epistemic norms are internalist, premise 2 is upheld: adhering to them with a care for accuracy
can promote accurate beliefs about a loved one. Second, an epistemic bias makes cognition about
your loved one more reliable. This makes it easier to adhere to externalist epistemic norms, in
turn making excellent love more achievable than the objector thinks—premise 1 does not reduce
to absurdity. The claim that we can have an epistemic bias is subject to empirical confirmation,
but I take it to be at least prima facie plausible—enough so, for example, that Jollimore (2011,
chapter 6) argues that love itself is generally accuracy-conducive, and Mason (2020) argues that
love entails knowledge of the beloved.
I conclude that neither version of the objection from distortion threatens the epistemic view.
Addressing the Arguments for the Partiality View
We may now address the arguments for the partiality view mentioned in Sect. 2. One is that a
person who loves excellently is committed to a positive view of the loved one’s character
(Stroud, 2006, 511–512). My response is that she is committed instead to her loved one. The best
loving commitments are for better or worse—which only makes sense when “worse” is a
relevant category.
The second argument draws an analogy with action (Hazlett, 2013, 93). We treat our loved ones
better than others whom we do not love, so, surely, we should believe better of them than of
others. But it should now be clear that belief is disanalogous to action, not least since partial
actions—such as supporting a loved one in recovering from addiction—can be better targeted if
your beliefs are accurate.
The third argument draws on phenomenology. Loving excellently, it says, involves sticking up
for loved ones, including in our own minds (Stroud, 2006, 503–504). In response, sticking up for
a loved one is not a matter of believing well of him come what may, but of loving him come
what may (and expressing this when need be to others), while holding up an image of what he
could be. What about the claim that we feel excellently loved when we are thought better than
those who love us have reason to believe (Keller, 2004, 338; Hazlett, 2013, 90)? I think that a
love in which such a desire dominates, as opposed to the desire to be known as one is, is not
entirely healthy. I agree with the weaker idea that love involves a desire to be thought positively
of; but surely this should motivate one to become the sort of person of whom a lover can think
positively without violating epistemic norms.
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The fourth argument draws on the quality view, according to which love is based on your loved
one’s positive features. Inflated beliefs, the thought goes, help sustain love (Stroud, 2006, 511).
One response is to use this claim as a reductio of the quality view: what kind of love can only be
kept afloat by distorting its object to please the lover? A second response, however, is
compatible with the quality view (cf. Mason, 2020). Instead of burdening the lover to think her
loved one better than epistemic norms allow, we might motivate the loved one to become the
best person he can be—not from fear of abandonment, but to fulfill the positive vision of himself
reflected by his lover’s value of him, and to bring his lover happiness along the way. At the same
time the lover can be challenged to grow by showing the loved one grace. When we combine the
quality view with the epistemic view, it promotes both parties’ moral transformation; when we
combine it with the partiality view, it motivates both parties to deceive the lover.
The epistemic view faces a common objection that, it should be clear by now, rests on a mistake.
It is that this view construes excellent love as involving a neutral detachment, which has no place
for the special glow with which lovers perceive and think about loved ones (Baron, 1991). For
how else could lovers ensure that their beliefs are accurate? The objection would hold if
evidence from personal experiences of the loved one were epistemically inadmissible. Far from
it. As we saw, personal experience of loved ones helps us know them better than otherwise,
provided that we match the bias of love with an epistemic bias (Sect. 6). The epistemic view
facilitates seeing the beloved much more accurately than someone would who did not love her,
indeed much more intimately.
Conclusion
The partiality view draws on strong intuitive and theoretical considerations—but it is false.
Excellent love does not involve violating epistemic norms, even when epistemic norms point to
negative beliefs about the loved one. On the contrary: as the epistemic view says, negative
beliefs no less than positive ones, when accurate, are crucial for excellent love.
One reason is that both promote fitting emotional responses to your loved one, which help make
love excellent. Delight in your loved one’s features as they really are staves off idolatry (on your
part) or the imposter syndrome (on his). Fitting grief at your loved one’s negative features, or the
real possibility of it, is necessary for vulnerability and for showing grace; these can in turn foster
a sense of safety, secure attachment, and moral transformation. Another reason is that accurate
beliefs about your loved one are crucial for caring for him: they enable a more caring response
than positive but mistaken beliefs, and turn the focus from evaluating the loved one to valuing
him.
We have seen that love comes with a perceptual bias that can promote accurate beliefs but can
also distort. This is why excellent love involves not just adhering to epistemic norms, but doing
so motivated by a countervailing epistemic bias, which counteracts the distorting effects of love’s
perceptual bias while supporting the accuracy-conducive ones.
What of the intuition that love by nature bursts certain constraints, including epistemic ones?
Epistemic constraints, it turns out, are less like those of pointless convention or unhealthy beauty
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standards, which love does well to defy, and more like those of personal autonomy or the age of
consent, which love is realized by respecting.
We need not worry that the epistemic view depletes love of its mystery or suspense. For love
often involves a desire to be known for who you are (on the part of the beloved) and a rapt
attentiveness (on the part of the lover) that meets this need. What makes love mysterious and
suspenseful is that this journey of mutual discovery stretches over time, and the fact that—given
human complexity—it can never be complete. This journey includes a quest, among many other
things, for accuracy—which the partiality view impedes, but the epistemic view facilitates.
֍

֍

֍

Endnotes
1. I alternate between the pronouns “she/her”, “he/him”, and “they/them”. To avoid
ambiguity, when speaking of lovers and loved ones in the singular I use “she/her” and
“he/him”. I intend no normative connotations.
2. My working assumption, of little consequence here, is that love and friendship overlap
significantly but neither entails the other. This is in contrast to Mason (2020), who takes
friendship to entail love.
3. See Kolodny (2003); cf. (Jollimore, 2011, chapter 3).
4. Crawford (2016) rejects the prescriptive claim while remaining open to the evaluative
one.
5. See (Dormandy, forthcoming) for a discussion of doxastic partiality in religious faith.
6. Hazlett’s view, unlike the others, is stated dispositionally (2013, 97): the person who
loves excellently is disposed to believe positively in defiance of epistemic norms,
whether or not he does so. But I take it that if a person never manifests this disposition,
his belief-formation, contrary to Hazlett’s view, would not be unreliable.
7. Epistemic reliabilism, which says that what matters for epistemic purposes is the
reliability of belief-forming practices, is defended for example by (Goldman, 1979).
Virtue-theoretic forms of reliabilism specify that these belief-forming practices stem from
cognitive mechanisms that successfully aim at the truth (e.g., Greco, 2010).
8. Jollimore too reads the partiality view this way (2011, Chapter 3).
9. Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, Song XII, “Orpheus and Eurydice”.
10. See (Dormandy, forthcoming) for a defense of a version of the epistemic view in the case
of religious faith.
11. What about permissive epistemology (discussed in the previous section)? I suspect that
this can be accuracy-conducive, as long as the range of acceptable doxastic attitudes
given a particular body of evidence is not too wide.
12. Crawford too (2019) might superficially be read as endorsing the epistemic view. But she
declines to endorse clause (i), while arguing against it (1590–1593). She leaves open the
possibility that friendship might be made excellent by defying epistemic norms. Crawford
does, however, endorse clause (ii), on the grounds that lacking at least the motivation to
believe accurately about your friends would amount to “inauthentic engagement” with
them (1589).
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13. (Grimm, 2010; Hills, 2015). I am neutral concerning whether understanding entails
accuracy; all I am claiming is that a (relatively high degree of) accuracy entails
understanding.
14. There is reason to think that accurate beliefs are also intrinsically valuable for love
(Kawall, 2013), but this discussion must await another occasion.
15. Crawford’s argument (2019), though apparently similar, is importantly different. She
argues that an excellent lover responds to “object-given reasons”, that is, to reasons
arising from his loved one’s features as he perceives them. I have no problem with this
idea. Where Crawford differs from me is over what happens when these object-given
reasons, because of love’s perceptual bias, are inaccurate or misleading, so that the lover
forms an inaccurately positive view of the loved one. Crawford argues that his love in
this case is no less excellent: what matters is that he has responded to his object-given
reasons, accuracy-conducive or not (1591–1592). I argue, in contrast, that his love is less
excellent, since what matters is the accuracy of his beliefs about the loved one.
16. I assume that features have valences independently of emotional responses to them, but
remain neutral about the metaphysical links between features and responses; see
(Pettigrove, 2021).
17. The doxastic partialist Hazlett says that partiality just is wishful thinking (2013, 93).
Critics Arpaly and Brinkerhoff (2018), in contrast, argue that such a lover objectifies his
loved one (44).
18. One problem with Crawford’s (2019) argument that love should respond to the beloved’s
perceived, as opposed to genuine, features is that idolatry remains a live possibility.
19. The modality of the requirement (psychological? conceptual?) does not matter here.
20. The sentence “He had overcome … convictions” is imported from Chapter XXX; the rest
of the quote appears in sequence in Chapter XXIX.
21. For discussion of secure and insecure attachment see (Bowlby, 1980).
22. And in this way she gains new self-knowledge, often a catalyst for healing. Thanks to an
anonymous reviewer for this point.
23. See for example the story of Maria von Herbert in (Langton, 1992).
24. I am not committed to Velleman’s criticism that caring involves a disposition to meddle
(1999, 353): I agree with Pettigrove (2012, 91–95) that care includes respecting the
beloved’s autonomy (cf. Ebels-Duggan, 2008, 154).
25. Paul and Morton (2018) agree that believing accurately about a friend’s future prospects
is more important, in caring for her, than believing positively. But where they endorse
epistemic permissivism and pragmatic encroachment to accommodate partialist
intuitions, I remain neutral on these views and take partialist intuitions to be mistaken.
26. See http://proactivecoaching.info/shoppac/ (accessed November 9, 2019).
27. The objection holds with other versions of internalism and externalism, but space
prohibits discussion here.
28. How it does so depends on how types of belief-forming process are individuated, which I
cannot discuss here.
29. For a similar argument see (Crawford, 2019, 1590).
ↈ
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